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	Individual	mortgage	borrowers	are,	by	their	very	nature,	borrowers	who	depend	on	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions	 to	 grant	 them	 a	 mortgage	 loan.	 The	decision-making	is	wholly	on	the	financial	sector	side.		Mistakes	 made	 by	 the	 financial	 sector	 should	 have	 led	 to	 institutions,	 their	shareholders	and	 their	management	 teams	accepting	 responsibility	and	paying	for	their	actions.	An	individual	bank	may	claim	that	it	was	the	collective	behavior	of	all	banks	and	financial	institutions	in	granting	mortgage	loans	and	that	the	last	lender	tipped	over	the	whole	structure	of	mortgage	lending.	However,	both	the	banking	and	 financial	 regulators	as	well	 as	each	 individual	 financial	 institution	involved	 in	mortgage	 lending,	 should	have	been	alert	 to	 the	risks	 taken	during	the	2004	to	2007	mortgage	lending	period.		The	selling	off	of	such	mortgage	portfolios	accelerated	during	the	period	2004-2007	as	compared	to	previous	periods.		Securitization	began	to	take	off	in	the	mid-1990s.	The	total	amount	of	mortgage-backed	securities	issued	almost	tripled	between	1996	and	2007,	to	$7.3	trillion.	The	 securitized	 share	 of	 subprime	mortgages	 (i.e.,	 those	 passed	 to	 third-party	investors	via	mortgage	backed	securities)	increased	from	54%	in	2001,	to	75%	in	2006.	The	subprime	part	of	all	home	mortgages	reached	$1.46	trillion	at	the	beginning	of	2007	or	about	14%	of	the	total	home	mortgage	amount	outstanding	in	 the	 U.S.	 at	 the	 time.	 	In	 the	mid-2000s	 as	 the	 housing	market	was	 peaking,	Government	Sponsored	Enterprises	 (GSE)	securitization	market	 share	declined	dramatically,	 while	 higher-risk	 subprime	 and	 Alt-A2 	mortgage	 private	 label	securitization	 grew	 sharply.	As	mortgage	 defaults	 began	 to	 rise,	 it	 was	 among	mortgages	securitized	by	the	private	banks.	GSE	mortgages	–securitized	or	not–	continued	to	perform	better	than	the	rest	of	the	market.			
















	In	the	U.S.,	a	liability	regime	for	mis-selling	financial	products	did	and	does	exist.	As	at	October	2017,	$150	billion	in	fines	had	been	collected	by	the	Department	of	Justice	 from	various	U.S.	and	 foreign	banks	 involved	 in	 the	subprime	mortgage	crisis.4	However	 the	 strange	 element	 in	 all	 this	 is	 that	 the	 proceeds	 were	 not	used	 to	 compensate	 home	 mortgage	 borrowers,	 but	 were	 used	 for	 general	government	expenditure	purposes.		The	detrimental	 impact	on	home	mortgage	borrowers,	 on	 the	 income	 levels	of	many	 individual	 households	 and	 on	 government	 revenues	 and	 expenditure	levels	 can	 be	 illustrated	 with	 a	 few	 statistics	 about	 employment	 levels,	government	debt	levels,	new	housing	starts	and	average	income	levels.		In	May	2007,	 the	U.S.	 economy	had	an	unemployment	 rate	of	4.4%	with	2.231	million	unemployed	persons.	By	October	2009	the	unemployment	rate	had	gone	up	 to	10.0%	with	9.087	million	unemployed5.	Nearly	7	million	 individuals	 lost	their	 jobs	 in	 slightly	 over	 two-years.	 It	 took	 to	 July	2018	 to	 get	 the	number	of	unemployed	back	down	to	2.406	million.	This	was	an	adjustment	period	of	over	11	years	marked	by	tremendous	hardship	for	those	unemployed	during	it.		One	of	the	other	main	consequences	of	the	financial	crisis	was	the	change	in	U.S.	government	debt	 levels6.	 In	2007	Q4,	the	outstanding	level	of	government	debt	was	 $9.229	 trillion.	 By	 2017	 Q4	 the	 level	 had	 more	 than	 doubled	 to	 $20.492	trillion.	 To	 put	 this	 in	 a	 historical	 perspective:	 from	Q4	 1977	 to	 Q4	 1987	 U.S.	Federal	 government	 debt	 increased	 by	 338%	 from	 $	 718.9	 billion	 to	 $2.431	trillion.	From	Q4	1987	to	Q4	1997	the	debt	increased	by	226%	to	$5.502	trillion.	From	Q4	1997	 to	Q4	2007	 the	debt	 increased	by	168%	 to	$	9.229	 trillion	and	from	Q4	2007	to	Q4	2017	the	debt	increased	by	222%	to	$	20.492	trillion.		In	a	study7	by	William	Dupor,	economist	at	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	in	St.	Louis,	it	was	calculated	 that,	as	a	consequence	of	 the	recession,	 the	debt	 to	GDP	 level	increased	by	16%	from	Q2	2007	to	Q2	2009	or	8%	per	year.	From	Q2	2009	to	Q2	2012	the	ratio	increased	by	6.2%	per	year.	From	Q2	2012	to	Q2	2015	the	ratio	only	increased	by	1.4%	per	year.																																																																																																	4	https://www.dwhttp.com/en/financial-crisis-bank-fines-hit-record-10-years-after-market-collapse/a-40044540Benjam		5	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE/		6	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN	7	https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/january/how-us-debt-gdp-ratio-changed	
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	In	 this	 chapter	 some	 questions	 will	 be	 raised	 about	 the	 approaches	 used	 to	counteract	the	effects	of	the	subprime	mortgage	lending.		
4.1	The	legal	approach	








	The	economic	downturn	in	2007-2009	prompted	the	U.S.	Federal	government	to	borrow	 an	 additional	 amount	 of	 more	 than	 $4.5	 trillion	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	lower	 tax	 receipts	 and	 higher	 social	 security	 payments.	 This	 spending	 did	prevent	 economic	 growth	 from	 dropping	 further	 than	 without	 it	 but	nevertheless	Real	GDP	levels16	dropped	from	Q3	2007	on	an	annualized	level	of	$15.667	trillion	to	Q3	2009	$15.189	trillion	measured	on	the	same	annual	basis.	In	other	words	the	$4.5	trillion	injection	was	unable	to	stem	the	slightly	over	3%	loss	in	real	GDP	over	this	period.		The	 Federal	 Reserve	 engaged	 in	 large-scale	 asset	 purchases	 over	 a	 number	 of	years:	 Quantitative	 Easing.	 In	 an	 article	 written	 by	 Stephen	 D.	 Williamson17:		“How	well	does	this	tool	work?”	the	author	explains	the	use	and	the	prescribed	benefits	 from	 this	 unconventional	 policy	 tool.	 The	 main	 aim	 was	 a	 liquidity	supply	to	the	financial	markets	and	a	tool	to	adjust	especially	long-term	interest	rates.	 The	 assets	 purchased	 were	 government	 treasuries	 and	 some	 corporate	bonds	 and	 mortgage	 backed	 securities,	 the	 latter	 mostly	 from	 Government	Sponsored	Enterprises,	such	as	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddy	Mac.	In	total	$3.6	trillion	of	 assets	were	purchased	 in	 three	different	programs.18	Currently	 the	Fed	 is	 in	the	process	of	selling	some	of	its	holdings.		
4.3	An	Alternative	Economic	Approach	
	With	 over	 $8	 trillion	 spend	 between	 the	 U.S.	 Government	 and	 the	 Federal	Reserve,	the	first	through	borrowings	(debt	creation	in	2008	and	2009)	and	the	latter	 through	 money	 creation;	 one	 may	 wonder	 why	 the	 economic	 recovery	took	 so	 long	 to	 materialize.	 After	 all,	 the	 amount	 of	 securitized	 sub-prime	mortgages	outstanding	was	“only”	$	1.1	trillion	at	its	highest	level.		It	seems	that	the	key	to	understanding	what	happened	is	linked	to	the	changes	in	the	 financial	position	of	 individual	households.	They	were	 the	ones	affected	by	foreclosure	filings,	 increased	unemployment	rates,	dropping	house	prices	while	their	 outstanding	 debt	 levels	 remained	 static.	 Arrears	 in	 payment	 obligations	forced	many	to	forego	additional	consumption.	Many	of	them	were	also	the	ones	who	 lost	 their	 own	 equity	 in	 their	 homes:	 a	 loss	 that	 caused	 dropping	 home	ownership	levels	as	they	could	no	longer	save	enough	for	down	payments	on	a	different	home.	Indirectly,	each	household	would	have	to	pay	for	the	$4.5	trillion	in	 the	 additional	 government	 debt.	 The	 simple	 conclusion	 was	 and	 is	 that	individual	households	were	 left	 to	manage	on	their	own	while	being	presented	with	the	bill	from	the	greed	and	mismanagement	by	the	financial	sector.																																																									16	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1/	17	https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/third-quarter-2017/quantitative-easing-how-well-does-this-tool-work	18	http://www.numbernomics.com/nomicsnotes/?p=7375	
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